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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
26 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Possible New Surprises in Cyprus and/or Greece

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2. Looking first at Greece, it is difficult to see what more could happen. The abolition of the monarchy may occur, but there has been no hint so far that this is part of anyone's plans. The coup leaders' apparent policy has been to keep the King if he will cooperate. A dramatic switch in foreign policy seems out of the question at this time, too.

3. Regarding Cyprus, there are a number of possibilities. They are listed in descending order of probability.

a. A purge of Greek officers in Cyprus opposed to the coup. These officers, especially the senior ones, evidently themselves expect to be at least transferred. But there is nothing very dramatic about this, under the circumstances.

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b. A move by the Greek forces in Cyprus to round up Communists and other leftists in Cyprus, whether or not Makarios is willing. Cypriot leftists, as seen by their press, evidently are apprehensive that this will happen. It could provoke a crisis in Athens' relations with Makarios, who probably sees the coup on the mainland as another opportunity to solidify the independence of the island.

c. An attempt by Greek troops on the island to overthrow Makarios and set up a government more compatible with the new regime in Athens--i.e., more hard-nosed and overtly anti-Communist. This might flow out of (b), or be a prelude to it. Makarios, however, is no Kanellopoulos--and no Constantine, either. This would be a tricky operation for the Greeks to handle, especially since the Turks would likely equate this with enosis.

d. An attempt to remove only General Grivas, who commands the Cypriot National Guard and who has long been difficult for Athens to control. On the other hand, Grivas personally is the kind of hard-nosed activist that may appeal to the new group in Athens.

e. Least likely is simple, "instant enosis." The risks here would seem to be prohibitive, particularly the risk that the Greeks might get a very bloody nose in a military encounter with their Turkish NATO allies. This plus the other complications surrounding enosis--and these would include (b) and (c) above--would seem rationally to be just what the new regime does not need after only one week in power.

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